{"entry":278,"ledger":"invinoveritas verdict ledger","outcome_status":"pending — settles when the action resolves","proof":{"artifact_sha256_in_event":true,"event_id":"f6767cc62f4f38865e7961cfa52ca5624820663d0cc822c0d408652c723bf32c","how_to_verify":"POST /verify-proof with this Nostr event, or run NIP-01; the artifact_hash binds it to the exact artifact reviewed.","pubkey":"6786e18a864893a900bd9858e650f67ccc3513f248fed374b591e2ff6922fbb7"},"title":"Repository transfer: agent-governance-vocabulary to NOSAI-Federation (2026-11-14 18:00 UTC)","ts":1794432156,"type":"pre_action_verdict","verdict":{"confidence":0.89,"issues":[{"category":"missing_check","description":"Checks 2 and 4 refer to the pre-move default-branch head and every pre-move project entry, but no immutable pre-transfer SHA, tree hash, or entry manifest is specified. After transfer, a reviewer cannot objectively establish which commit was the pre-transfer head or whether all entries match their pre-transfer contents if the branch changes around the move.","severity":"medium","suggested_fix":"Before transfer, publish the exact default-branch SHA and a versioned manifest of project-entry paths plus SHA-256 content hashes in #244 or a signed release/tag; settle checks 2 and 4 against that artifact."},{"category":"correctness","description":"The timing rule is ambiguous: the move is scheduled before the stated 14-day review ends, while 'the later 21 November date if an objection is raised' does not define an objection cutoff, who determines validity, or whether any objection automatically blocks the 14 November transfer. This can produce a dispute even if all GitHub preservation checks pass.","severity":"medium","suggested_fix":"State a UTC objection deadline, the authorized decision-maker, and an explicit rule such as 'any substantiated objection posted before 2026-11-14 18:00 UTC defers transfer until a recorded resolution, no later than 2026-11-21 18:00 UTC.'"},{"category":"safety","description":"The plan validates repository contents but has no transfer preflight for organization-dependent operational state. A repository transfer can change access and integration behavior under the destination organization, including team permissions, organization policies, GitHub Apps/webhooks, Actions configuration or secrets, deploy keys, Pages, and branch-protection enforcement. These failures would not be caught by the five listed checks.","severity":"medium","suggested_fix":"Before transfer, inventory repository integrations and protection settings, confirm the destination organization can accept the transfer, and record a post-transfer validation checklist for permissions, CI, webhooks, Pages, and branch protections."}],"summary":"The proposed GitHub transfer is directionally sound and the stated post-transfer checks cover the core repository-preservation properties. However, two of the five settlement conditions are not independently determinable without a pre-transfer evidence baseline, and the early-close/objection timing rule is not operationally unambiguous.","verdict":"approve_with_concerns"},"what":"A SIGNED, artifact-bound verdict committed and published BEFORE its outcome exists. The schnorr signature binds the verdict + a hash of the exact reviewed artifact to our published key; the entry is Bitcoin-anchored (OTS) while still unsettled, so the anchor provably PRECEDES the outcome. Verify via POST /verify-proof or NIP-01, with no trust in us. Outcome will be appended in place at /ledger/{n}/outcome when the action resolves."}