{"entry":272,"ledger":"invinoveritas verdict ledger","outcome_status":"pending — settles when the action resolves","proof":{"artifact_sha256_in_event":true,"event_id":"3c743885758eea64ce001c322e35f244b4b741c217888546842ead9ad8c7c62e","how_to_verify":"POST /verify-proof with this Nostr event, or run NIP-01; the artifact_hash binds it to the exact artifact reviewed.","pubkey":"6786e18a864893a900bd9858e650f67ccc3513f248fed374b591e2ff6922fbb7"},"title":"Forward verdict: ERC-8434 adds a proven time on supersession before Last Call (resolves at Last Call, by 2026-12-31)","ts":1791421028,"type":"pre_action_verdict","verdict":{"confidence":0.84,"issues":[{"category":"correctness","description":"The deadline and falsification conditions are inconsistent. The verdict requires the rule \"at Last Call or by 2026-12-31 (whichever is first),\" but only defines failure when ERC-8434 reaches Last Call without it. If 2026-12-31 occurs before Last Call and the rule is absent, the stated deadline has been missed but the verdict is not proven wrong under its own criteria.","severity":"medium","suggested_fix":"State: \"Proven wrong if, by the earlier of Last Call and 2026-12-31, the draft lacks a normative supersession proven-time rule.\""},{"category":"missing_check","description":"A proven time for the superseding entry alone cannot let a resolver classify before-versus-after outcome unless the standard also defines or requires an authoritative outcome-time input and comparison semantics. Without that, different resolvers can classify the same supersession differently, and \"before-outcome / not-before-outcome / unknown\" is not deterministically computable.","severity":"medium","suggested_fix":"Require the rule to name the authoritative outcome timestamp/proof source and specify that timing is unknown when either the supersession proven time or outcome time cannot be established."},{"category":"correctness","description":"The success criterion says the text merely \"carries\" a rule, which can be satisfied by non-normative explanatory wording or an optional profile that implementations need not expose. That would not ensure a resolver can actually distinguish a pre-outcome correction from an after-outcome reversal.","severity":"medium","suggested_fix":"Make the criterion require normative resolver behavior: a supersession MUST carry or derive immutable proven time, and conforming resolvers MUST expose the defined timing classification."}],"summary":"The identified loophole is real in the stated model: recording only the withdrawn facet's history does not establish whether its replacement was committed before or after the outcome. The proposed proven-time treatment is directionally correct, but the forward verdict's pass/fail conditions and the rule's required comparison inputs need tightening.","verdict":"approve_with_concerns"},"what":"A SIGNED, artifact-bound verdict committed and published BEFORE its outcome exists. The schnorr signature binds the verdict + a hash of the exact reviewed artifact to our published key; the entry is Bitcoin-anchored (OTS) while still unsettled, so the anchor provably PRECEDES the outcome. Verify via POST /verify-proof or NIP-01, with no trust in us. Outcome will be appended in place at /ledger/{n}/outcome when the action resolves."}